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Total Disability Evaluation Under the
Louisiana Compensation Act
Wex S. Malone*
In 1932 a lineman named Fred Knispel employed by the Gulf
States Utilities Company in Lake Charles fell from a pole and
suffered a paresis of the superior oblique muscle of the right eye.
When the victim's head was in certain positions with both eyes
open, he suffered from double vision. This condition was perma-
nent and it had a marked effect upon his working ability. Knis-
pel's fight for compensation became the storm center of a dispute
over the proper definition of the term total disability in the Lou-
isiana Workmen's Compensation Statute.' Knispel's counsel
showed that his affliction made it dangerous and virtually im-
possible for him to continue carrying on his work as a lineman
and also deprived him of the ability to do structural iron work
or to be a radio mechanic or a carpenter - the only allied trades
for which he had a demonstrated aptitude. The court observed
in passing that the only occupations which were specifically
shown to be open to him were those of night watchman or porter;
but it seems fair to surmise that most tasks of unskilled labor
which could be performed on the ground and demanded no spe-
cial precision of eyesight were still well within his capacity.
The case required an interpretation of the provision of our
compensation act, which defines total disability as "disability to
do work of any reasonable character."'2 Counsel for the defend-
ant employer contended earnestly that work was available to
Knispel which was reasonable and would provide an income, al-
though admittedly he would receive less than before the accident
and would be required to adjust himself to new conditions. The
defendant urged, therefore, that the disability was not total. This
contention, however, was dismissed, and the Louisiana Supreme
Court laid down a formula for total disability that gave an en-
tirely different meaning to the language of the act. Said the
court:
"The disability should, we think be deemed total to do
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1932).
2. LA. R.S. 23:1221(2) (1950).
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work of any reasonable character, within the intendment of
the law, whenever it appears that the employee, due to the
injury, is unable to perform work of the same or similar de-
scription that he is accustomed to perform. When he is un-
able to perform such character of work, his occupation, due
to the injury received in his employer's service, has been
taken from him, and he is in the world without an occupation.
In his position he is wholly incapacitated, and what little he
may learn or be able to do thereafter will likely be done under
greater difficulties, placing him at a disadvantage even in
securing what work he may be able to perform."8
This definition, which permits a finding of total disability
whenever the worker is deprived of his capacity to do work sim-
ilar in description to that which he was doing at the time of in-
jury has persisted ever since the decision in Knispel's case.4 It
has received the consistent praise of those members of the legal
profession who regularly represent claimants, and it has been
damned with equal fervor by defendants' counsel. During the
twenty-seven years which have elapsed, every decision in which
the courts have pondered the Knispel formula in some new fact
setting has been eagerly scanned by the profession to determine
whether there is apparent any slight shifting in the winds of
judicial temper.
Our courts of appeal have not always accepted the Knispel
formula with complete equanimity. In 1949 the Court of Appeal
for the Second Circuit was urged to reconsider the entire mat-
ter afresh. Although it declined to abandon the rule of the Knis-
pel case, yet it observed somewhat sadly that, "if [the matter]
were [one] of first impression, we lean strongly to the belief
that our opinion would be otherwise than we now feel constrained
to render." 5 Finally, writers have not infrequently characterized
the Knispel formula as being out of line with the trend of judi-
cial decision in this country."
3. Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 174 La. 401, 409, 141 So. 9, 12 (1932).
4. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE 277,§§ 273, 274 (1951).
5. Boling v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 42 So.2d 567, 568 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1949). Janvier, J., of the Orleans Court of Appeal has perhaps more frequently
than other appellate judges voiced his feeling of perplexity over the Supreme
Court's interpretations of the Knispel rule. See, e.g., McAlister v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., 87 So.2d 354 (La. App. Orl. 1956).
6. Professor Larson attributes the Knispel formula to the fact that "permanent"
benefits are limited in Louisiana to 400 weeks and that our disability provision
should be regarded in the nature of a schedule-type award. 2 LARSON, THE LAW
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.53 (1952). It is difficult to accept this easy
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HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE KNISPEL FORMULA
An evaluation of the Knispel formula can appropriately begin
with a brief consideration as to how the rule emerged and how it
came to assume its present form. Louisiana Revised Statutes,
Section 23:1221, states that a worker is not totally disabled so
long as he can do work of any reasonable character. This would
appear to mean that a worker who can still do "reasonable" work
is not totally disabled even though he has lost his capacity to per-
form the same job he performed at the time of injury, so long as
he retains an obvious earning capacity in work that is available
to him, that he can perform, and that will help bring him a fair-
ly dependable livelihood.
We are slightly handicapped in considering the court's defi-
nition of this provision by reason of the fact that there was a
peculiar inconsistency in the original Burke-Roberts Act of 1914.
According to that statute, if the injury was total in character
but appeared to be only temporary in duration, it was described
as loss of ability to do work of any reasonable character; but if
the total disability was permanent, it was described as loss of
ability to do work of any character. 7 In other words, the qualify-
ing word reasonable was omitted when the total disability was
permanent but was included where the disability was only tem-
porary. This was probably due to inadvertence. Temporary total
and permanent total disabilities were not listed in direct sequence
in the original statute as they are in our present act, but were
separated by two printed pages, which probably obscured the in-
consistency.
Although this was corrected in 1918,8 yet by that time the
Supreme Court had had occasion to pass upon the term, perma-
nent total disability to do work of any character, as set forth in
the 1914 act. This was in the case of Myers v. Louisiana Railway
& Navigation Company,9 which has since become prominent in
explanation in view of the fact that in twenty-one other states compensation for
permanent total disability is limited for periods varying from 300 to 500 weeks.
Yet only Louisiana and Michigan test total disability according to the scheme de-
scribed in the text of this article. Furthermore, the tendency in other states to
extend compensation for the full period of disability is a comparatively recent de-
velopment in the statutes, which, incidentally, is continuing at an accelerated pace.
Even Samuel Horovitz, an ardent advocate of liberality toward the compensa-
tion claimant regards the use of the Knispel rule as less fair than the approach
adopted in other states. HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATIoN LAWS 275 (1944).
7. La. Acts 1914, No. 20, § 8(1).
8. La. Acts 1918, No. 38, § 1.
9. 140 La. 937, 74 So. 256 (1917).
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our jurisprudence for the part it played in developing the term
"arising out of employment."' 10 At the time of the injury the
claimant, Myers, was 60 years old. His hip joint was fractured,
and one year later, at the time of the trial, he was still unable to
go about without crutches. It was determined that he would never
be able to do such parts of a carpenter's work as climbing lad-
ders, or much walking around, or even much standing. The
court, however, emphasized that there were other lines of work
in which he might later manifest an earning capacity. It there-
fore conceded, with obvious reluctance, that such a worker's dis-
ability is not necessarily total. Nevertheless, the court managed
to affirm the trial judge's award of compensation for total per-
manent disability. The court justified this action by observing
that at the time of trial (a year after the accident) the healing
processes were not complete and any earning ability the worker
might acquire thereafter was entirely prospective and conjectur-
al. This conclusion was fortified through reference to the fact
that Myers' physical capacity to discharge the duties of some
other job offered no assurance that other employers would actual-
ly hire him in view of his age and physical condition. The im-
portance of this decision, for present purposes, is limited to the
fact that the court clearly recognized in Myers' case that fre-
quently judges can only venture a bare conjecture as to whether
the injured worker may at some future time be able to acquire
and hold a remunerative job different in character from the one
he held at the time of injury. Any determination that the work-
er can so do must rest upon speculations as to future conditions
of the labor market, upon possibilities relative to the claimant's
adaptability and ingenuity, and estimates as to the potential sym-
pathy and understanding of prospective employers. We shall dis-
cuss the importance of this observation later. For present pur-
poses it is sufficient to note that the prospect of facing this con-
jecture at the possible expense of the injured worker is one that
has induced courts everywhere to engraft exceptions or qualifica-
tions upon the usual formula that a worker is not totally dis-
abled so long as he can do any type of work that will bring him a
livelihood. In the Myers case our court had seized upon the dif-
ficulties and embarrassment that adhere in any effort to admin-
ister the commonly accepted definition of total disability and
these considerations prompted it to resolve all doubts in favor of
the claimant. The Myers case is the only decision that dealt with
10. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE
J§ 191, 192 (1951).
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the original definition of total disability under the 1914 statute.
From this point on, the courts were faced with the term "work
of any reasonable character," pursuant to the 1918 amendment.
The groundwork for the rule in Knispel's case was laid in
the first decision to define work of a reasonable character. This
was Franklin v. Ernest Roger Company, decided by the Court of
Appeal for the First Circuit in 1925.11 The claimant was a man-
ual worker who had suffered a serious injury to his leg and hip
so that he could neither walk, stoop, bend, nor use his leg. A
court interpreting almost any conceivable definition of total dis-
ability would find that, under these circumstances, Franklin was
totally disabled, and the court of appeal so held. However, it is
the language of the decision that is of interest here:
"The language 'permanent total disability to do work of
any reasonable character during period of disability' in the
legislation in question does not mean that the party must be
unable to do any kind of work, but means permanent total
disability to do work of any reasonable character that the
party knows how to do and is capable of doing, which will
afford him a support for himself and family.'1 2 (Emphasis
added.)
It is noteworthy that the court could have reached the conclusion
that Franklin was totally disabled by merely stating that there
is no labor market in which dependable regular employment is
available for a man who cannot either walk or stoop. But the
court chose to state that reasonable work means work that the
party knows how to do and which he is capable of doing. This
was perhaps an unnecessary enlargement of the definition of
total disability. Once the court has arrived at this point, it is an
easy step to the next conclusion, that reasonable work means
work for which the injured claimant has a proved aptitude. The
final step is equally easy and inviting. In most instances, the
claimant has an acknowledged aptitude only for the general type
of work in which he was previously employed. At this point, we
need not be surprised to discover that we are approaching the
rule of the Knispel case.
This gradual and almost imperceptible shifting of meaning
suggested above is clearly exemplified in the next important
case on the subject of total disability, McQueen v. Union Indem-
11, 2 La. App. 764 (1925).
12. Id. at 766.
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nity Company, decided by the Court of Appeal for the First Cir-
cuit just one year before the Knispel decision.13 Here again, the
court's conclusion that McQueen was totally disabled is one that
would have been reached in any jurisdiction under almost any
conceivable formula of total disability. McQueen had suffered a
paralysis of the spinal cord, resulting in a condition known as
drop foot, in which his leg was an actual impediment, dragging
uselessly behind him. He had also lost all ability to control his
bowel movements. There probably would have been no contention
that he was only partially disabled had it not been for the fact
that McQueen's wife operated a gasoline filling station to support
the family and he was able to be of some limited assistance in
this enterprise. Clearly he would not have been hired by any
employer who was not influenced by sympathy or family ties.
Again, as in Franklin v. Roger Company, we are interested
primarily in the way in which the test of disability was ex-
pressed.
"We do not believe," said the court, "that the law ever con-
templated that, if the injured employee recovered to the point
where he became capable of performing any kind of work of
a reasonable character, regardless of its nature, that he was
to be deprived of further compensation that was otherwise
due him. We are rather of the opinion that it meant that he
should be able to perform work that is reasonably of the same
kind or character of the one he was accustomed to perform
and is capable of doing. It is hardly conceivable that it ever
intended that an employee who was a skilled worker in any
trade, earning an average weekly wage which entitled him to
the maximum compensation of $20 per week, should be de-
nied that compensation because forsooth there came a time
during the period of compensation when he was able to earn
$4 to $5 per week as a helper around a filling station.' '14
The opinion relies strongly upon the Franklin case. The last
step has been taken. The court points out that the fact that some
kind of work, even of a reasonable character, may be available
to claimant is not enough to prevent him from being totally dis-
abled within the meaning of the act. For the first time, the
particular skilled nature of the victim's trade is emphasized and
13. 136 Se. 761 (La. App. 1931).
14. Id. at 763.
19601
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the court suggests that the loss of the capacity to do the same
work is enough to constitute total disability.
From the above observations it seems that our present test
of total disability springs from the seed planted in Franklin v.
Roger Company and was expanded to its full stature in McQueen
v. Union Indemnity Company. The matter had already been
debated and the test was already available for the Supreme
Court when that tribunal decided Fred Knispel's case. But it
was the Knispel decision that crystallized the rule and gave it
permanence by imprinting upon it the sanction of the Supreme
Court. Without this the rule would probably not have survived,
since both the McQueen and Franklin cases were concerned with
serious injuries which could be regarded as totally disabling
under almost any rule imaginable, and the statements in these
two decisions could have been dismissed later as unnecessary to
the determination. It is not clear in either of these cases that
the courts of appeal were fully aware that they were innovating;
but in the Knispel case the Supreme Court deliberately con-
cluded that a skilled lineman need not be a porter, watchman, or
common laborer, nor need he learn a new trade, and it carefully
explained why it thought this conclusion was proper.
One final observation is necessary to any fair historical per-
spective of the Louisiana total disability picture. The idea that
an employee is totally disabled whenever he cannot perform the
normal tasks of a single designated occupation (although he can
,concededly do other kinds of remunerative work) stands in sharp
-contrast with Section 23:1221(3) of the Statute, which deals
with enumerated losses of designated extremities or organs of
the body. These scheduled losses include fingers, toes, hands,
:arms, feet, legs, and eyes. Provision is made for the payment
,of disability compensation for a specifically designated number
of weeks which is narrowly limited in each instance. Only in the
few situations where the victim has suffered the loss of both
hands, both feet, both eyes, or the loss of one hand and one foot
is he entitled under the schedule to compensation for the full
four hundred weeks that would be allowed for total permanent
disability. Otherwise the compensation period is much shorter.
'The loss of one leg, for example, justifies full compensation for
only one hundred and seventy-five weeks. So striking a contrast
between the scheduled losses and the liberal provision for total
disability under the Knispel rule could hardly be tolerated within
the confines of a single compensation system. Either the sched-
[Vol. XX
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ule must be ignored whenever it conflicts with the disability pro-
vision, or the liberal version of disability described above must
be reduced to a more modest perspective that would harmonize
with the limited allowances for scheduled losses.
The first question, then, to arise is whether the limited com-
pensation provided in the schedule should mark the outside
limits of recovery even though the loss suffered by the worker
has rendered him totally disabled. It is noteworthy that the
specific loss provision does not require in so many words that
the compensation provided in the schedule shall be exclusive. The
schedule is prefaced only by the statement, "In the following
cases the compensation shall be as follows: . . . ." Similar lan-
guage is employed in connection with the scheduled loss provi-
sions in the compensation statutes of other states. Statutory
differences make it difficult to pronounce arbitrarily that there
is a clear majority position. 15 If any generality is possible, we
may venture the observation that in most of the decisions out-
side Louisiana the courts have adopted the position that the
legislature intended that the scheduled provisions should prevail
over general disability provisions whenever there is a conflict,
and that when a listed loss has occurred without any appreciable
effect upon other portions of the body, no inquiry can be made
as to its disabling effects. 16
This prevailing attitude that the schedule is exclusive has
not escaped criticism even in the jurisdictions where it has been
adopted. A fair interpretation of the phrase, "In the following
cases the compensation shall be as follows," would seem to re-
quire that compensation for the limited number of weeks pro-
vided in the schedule should be awarded irrespective of any
absence of proof that the victim was in fact disabled. 17 It does
not follow, however, that the schedule must be regarded as pro-
15. See Shemel, Workmen's Compensation Awards for Injuries to Specific
Members of the Body, 30 CORN. L.Q. 218 (1944).
16. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Brown, 81 Ga. App. 790, 60 S.E.2d 245
(1950) ; Petroleum Casualty Co. v. Seale, 13 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Com. App. 1929) ;
Soukup v. Shores Co., 222 Iowa 272, 268 N.W. 598 (1936). Occasionally a statute
expressly provides that the schedule is exclusive, i.e., VA. CODE § 65-53 (1950).
The same is true in Kansas. See Annot., 129 A.L.R. 663 (1940). As indicated
later in note 40 infra many statutes, after setting forth the schedule of specific
injuries, conclude with a statement to the general effect that in "other cases" dis-
ability shall be determined in accordance with the facts. For conflicting interpre-
tations of this type of provision where the exclusive character of the schedule is
involved, see Note, 22 IOWA L. REv. 161 (1936).
17. This much is uncontroverted. Where a scheduled injury is sustained, the
claimant is entitled to his award even though he has since been regularly employed
at wages in excess of those paid before the accident. See cases collected in 2 L A-
SON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 58.10, n. 35 (1952).
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viding the outside limits of recovery even though the designated
specific loss has in fact served to disable the worker totally and
permanently. The schedule can be fairly regarded as an aid to
the simple administration of the statute, relieving the claimant
of the necessity of proving disability for specific losses in order
to entitle himself to an award for the limited number of weeks
prescribed in the schedule, but leaving open the possibility of
establishing a claim for a more extended award whenever the
claimant can show that in fact he is permanently and totally dis-
abled. In short, it seems reasonable to contend that there are
two parallel benefits provided for certain uncomplicated losses
and the rule of liberal construction requires that the claimants
be allowed the more favorable benefit. Most writers have favored
this view,18 and it has been adopted in several jurisdictions. 19
Of particular interest is the situation in Michigan where re-
cently the Supreme Court of that state denied the exclusive
character of the schedule after having followed the majority
position for thirty-seven years.
20
Even those courts adhering to the majority view on the ex-
clusive nature of the specific loss provisions have nevertheless
sought to avoid the provisions wherever possible. Almost uni-
versally the scheduled losses have received a strict and literal
interpretation. The loss of a leg under the schedule generally
means that there must have been a complete severance unattend-
ed by any complications. If the effect of an injury to the leg is to
produce disabling pain in other regions of the body, the schedule
will likely be ignored and compensation awarded on a disability
basis.2 1 Similarly, a leg injury which does not result in loss or
surgical amputation of the limb may entitle him to compensation
based upon his disability rather than to the arbitrary figure pro-
vided in the schedule for loss of a leg.22
The tendency described above to confine the application of
the schedule to cases of complete and uncomplicated loss domi-
18. Id. § 58.20.
19. In Massachusetts, Maine, and Rhode Island benefits for schedule losses are
in addition to disability benefits. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION 641 (1936).
20. Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch Co., 350 Mich. 135, 85 N.W.2d 97 (1957).
The interesting opinion by Voelker, J. (Anatomy of a Murder) deserves careful
reading.
21. See, e.g., Robinson v. Pitkin Moving Van Co., 258 App. Div. 829, 15
N.Y.S.2d 764 (1939). The cases are almost unanimous in this accord. Annot., 156
A.L.R. 1344 (1945). Johnson v. Anderson, 217 S.W.2d 939 (Tenn. 1949), noted
in 21 TENN. L. Rav. 208 (1950).
22. Ibid.
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nated the earliest Louisiana decisions.23 In this way our courts
were able for a time to avoid committing themselves on the
question of the exclusive character of the schedule. The lan-
guage of these early decisions, however, clearly suggests that
the general disability provisions would prevail in the event of a
direct conflict with the schedule. 24 Then followed a period in
the history of our litigation from 1926 until 1932 when the
courts, beginning with James v. Spence and Goldstein, Inc.,
25
appeared to commit themselves to the proposition that the limita-
tions of the schedule mark the outside limits of recovery. 26 But
this was not for long, for in the same decision in Fred Knispel's
case that gave the present definition to total disability the court
refused to limit compensation to the loss of one eye as provided
in the schedule.27 The resulting confusion in our jurisprudence
was finally put to rest in 1935 when the majority opinion of a
divided court in Barr v. Davis Bros. Lumber Co. announced,
". .. it was not the intention of the legislature to have [the
schedule] supersede and take precedence over the disability sec-
tions, but rather to supplement them. This conclusion is in har-
mony with the case of Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities Co.... and
the jurisprudence of this court on the subject and in keeping
with a fair and reasonable interpretation of the statute. ' 28 Thus
the court succeeded in ridding itself of the limitations of the
schedule and left the way clear to administer all disability claims
through the generous provisions of the Knispel formula.
PRESENT STATE OF THE KNISPEL FORMULA
The various ramifications of the Knispel formula have been
discussed elsewhere, 29 and need not be reconsidered here. It is
sufficient to observe that the worker qualifies as being totally
23. Norwood v. Lake Bisteneau Oil Co., 145 La. 823, 83 So. 25 (1919);
O'Donnell v. Fortuna Oil Co., 2 La. App. 462 (2d Cir. 1925). For numerous other
cases of this period, see MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
AND PRACTICE 348-50 (1951).
24. "If by reason of the fact that there is a total loss of the use of the leg, the
case might also fall under [the schedule]. If so, the situation would be that two
clauses of the act cover the case at bar. If then we should apply the clause giving
the smaller compensation, this would be adopting a liberal construction in favor
of the employer. But the jurisprudence is that a construction liberal to the em-
ployee should be adopted." Wilkinson v. Dubach Mill Co., 2 La. App. 249, 256
(2d Cir. 1925).
25. 161 La. 1108, 109 So. 917 (1926).
26. See the excellent account of this period of confusion in MAYER, WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION IN LOUISIANA 85-97 (1937).
27. Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1932).
28. 183 La. 1013, 1024, 165 So. 185, 188 (1935).
29. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 272-277 (1951).
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disabled not only when he is wholly incapacitated from doing
his former work, but likewise when he is unable to perform
certain isolated functions of his earlier job which are deemed
substantial parts of that calling.30 Similarly, total disability re-
sults where the performance of important functions of the old
trade involves pain and suffering to the claimant or danger to
himself or his co-workers.31
The situation of the unskilled or common laborer has given
some difficulty. The tasks assigned to unskilled workers vary
considerably from job to job and even from one hour to the
next. Hence it would be unfair to conclude that the manual
worker is totally disabled if he cannot perform the precise op-
eration in which he was engaged at the time of accident or if he
cannot do every act that an employer of manual labor could
conceivably order him to do. More flexibility is needed here.
To meet this need the Louisiana courts tend to emphasize that
the unskilled laborer is not totally disabled so long as he can do
work of reasonably the same character as that performed prior
to accident.32 In other decisions the courts have observed that
the unskilled laborer is to be regarded as totally disabled only
when he cannot substantially compete for regular employment
with able-bodied workers in the flexible market for common
labor.m
THE LOUISIANA DISABILITY FORMULA IN NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Writers on workmen's compensation have observed that the
Knispel formula for determining total disability differs from
the test that prevails in all other jurisdictions except, possibly,
Michigan. 4 And certainly most decisions elsewhere that have
30. Id. § 274.
31. Ibid.
32. Wright v. National Surety Corp., 221 La. 486, 59 So.2d 695 (1952)
Morgan v. American Bitumuls Co., 217 La. 968, 47 So.2d 739 (1950).
33. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 275
(1951). See particularly material in 1960 supplement to this work under § 275.
34. Foley v. Detroit United Railway, 190 Mich. 507, 514, 157 N.W. 45, 48
(1916). The test currently employed in Michigan was derived by its Supreme
Court from an interpretation of § 11(e) of the Michigan Compensation Statute
defining the wage basis upon which compensation is computed, and which read
in 1916 as follows:
"The weekly loss in wages referred to in this act shall consist of such percentage
of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee, computed according to the
provisions of this section, as shall fairly represent the proportionate extent of the
impairment of his earning capacity in the employment in which he was working
at the time of the accident, the same to be fixed as of the time of the accident,
but to be determined in view of the nature and extent of the injury. .. ." (Emphasis
added.)
Although one may well doubt that this provision was intended to do more than
(Vol. XX
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squarely faced the question have announced that a worker is not
totally disabled so long as he is capable of earning a livelihood
by doing any work of a reasonable character, even though dif-
ferent from the type of work that he was doing at the time of
his accident.35 Awards of permanent total disability outside
Louisiana constitute an inconsiderable percentage of the total.
In New York, for example, which accounts for at least 1/5 of
all total disability cases in the country, these represent only about
0.3% of all cases in that state.3 6
At first blush the picture presented seems to be one of a
striking contrast between the Louisiana situation with respect
to total disability and the situation prevailing elsewhere through-
out the nation. So broad a conclusion, however, may not be
entirely justified. It should be noted that numerous considera-
tions, including diversities of statutory approach to total dis-
ability in the several states, are involved. There is no uniform
legislative approach to the term, total disability, in the various
statutes. The compensation acts in one large group of states
recognize total disability as a classification entitling the claim-
ant to the maximum compensation available under the act, but
the legislatures in these states made no effort to define the term.
In most of the statutes in this group there is a provision specify-
ing that certain enumerated losses shall constitute total disability.
Usually included are the loss of both legs, both arms, or both
eyes.3 T A few states further specify that total and permanent
paralysis resulting from spinal injury or imbecility induced by
cranial injury shall amount to total disability.38 Many of the
establish the contract wage at time of accident as the basis for computing com-
pensation, the Michigan Supreme Court in the Foley case, supra, held that the
compensation must represent the impairment in the claimant's earning capacity
with reference to the specific employment in which he was working at the time of
accident. This rule persists today with only one modification. The allowable com-
pensation when added to the wages claimant can earn after the accident at a
different calling must not exceed the total wage earned prior to the accident, and
the estimated excess, if any, is deducted from the amount of compensation to be
allowed. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.161 (1950) ; Lynch v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 329 Mich.
168, 45 N.W.2d 20 (1950) ; MacDonald v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 268 Mich. 591,
256 N.W. 558 (1934).
35. Clark v. Henry & Wright Mfg. Co., 136 Conn. 514, 72 A.2d 489 (1950).
Cases collected in Annot., 149 A.L.R. 432 (1944). 2 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.53 (1952).
36. SOMERS & SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 60 (1954). The same
authors point out that of five representative states studied none paid more than
8% of its cash compensation payments on permanent totals, and three spent less
than 2%. Id. at 70.
37. Loss of both limbs, arms, or eyes constitutes total disability by the ex-
press terms of the statutes in all states except Indiana and North Dakota.
38. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 56-956(c) (1939) ; CALIF. LABOR CODE § 4662(d)
(1937) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7430 (1949) ; HAWAII REV. LAWS § 97-25 (1955) ;
The interesting opinion by Voelker, J. (Anatomy of Murder) deserves careful
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statutes in this group state expressly that the specific losses in
the total disability list are not exclusive.39 This intention is
sometimes manifested by a statement to the effect that "in other
instances total disability shall be determined in accordance with
the facts. '40  Even, however, if no such statement appears in
the act (as is frequently the case), the courts have consistently
allowed total disability compensation for other serious injuries
in addition to those set forth in the statute.41 The difference
between the listed and unlisted instances of total disability lies
in the fact that proof that the victim has suffered a loss of the
type listed in the statute will entitle him automatically to total
disability compensation, 42 while in all other cases he must af-
ford proof that his injury did in fact totally incapacitate him.
However, the significant feature of all the statutes discussed
above is that the term, total disability, is wholly undefined by
the legislature. One would not be justified in concluding that
the listed instances (all of which are of a highly serious char-
acter) are even suggestive of the type of injury that can ap-
propriately be regarded as totally disabling, for the listed in-
IDAHO CODE § 72-311 (1947) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. 44-510 (Supp. 1957); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 342.095 (1953) ; MAINE REV. STAT. c. 31, § 11 (1954) ; MO. STAT. ANN.
§ 287.200(2) (1939) ; NEV. REV. STAT. 616.575 (1957) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
281.23 (1955) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (1958) (total disability resulting from
brain and spinal injuries not subject to maximum limitations) ; S.D. CODE § 64.-
0403(4) (t) (1939) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS C. 300, art. 11, § 10(c), (f) (1938).
39. HAWAHI REV. LAWS § 97-25 (1955); IDAHO CODE § 72-311 (1947); ILL.
STAT. ANN. c. 48, § 145(e) (18), (j) (1941) ; Smith-Hurd, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
281:23 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. 59-10-18 (1953); S.D. CODE § 64.0403(4) (t)
(1939) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. 102.44(2) (1957).
40. ARIz. CODE ANN. § 56-956(c) (1939) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1313(a)
(1947) ; CALIF. LABOR CODE § 4662(d) (1937) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(1.b)
(1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. 44-510 (Supp. 1957); MD. CODE ANN. art. 101,§ 36(1) (a) (1955) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 6998-09(a) (recomp. 1952) ; Mo. STAT.
ANN. § 3706(b) (1939) ; NEV. REV. STAT. 616.575 (1957) ; N.Y. WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION LAW §15(i); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 85:22(1) (1951); W. VA. CODE
c. 23, § 2531(j) (1955).
41. Stanley v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 222 N.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 570 (1942).
42. This is expressly provided in California, Missouri, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, and West Virginia. CALIF. LABOR CODE § 4662 (1937) ; MO. STAT. ANN.§ 3706(b) (1939); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 281:24 (1955); R.I. GEN. LAWS
c. 300, art. II, § 10(c) (f) (1938) ; W. VA. CODE c. 23, § 2531(j) (1955). The
statutes in several states provide that the listed losses shall be regarded as totally
disabling in the absence of "proof" (or "conclusive proof") to the contrary. KAN.
GEN. STAT. 44-510 (Supp. 1957) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(1) (a) (1955) ;
NEV. REV. STAT. 616.575 (1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. 59-10-18 (1953); N.Y.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 15(i); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 85:22(1) (1951).
The provision in Utah is unique. When one of the listed losses is suffered an
immediate award for total disability shall be made by the commission. In other
cases of claimed total disability the commission is restricted to a tentative finding,
which does not become final until, after a period of attempted rehabilitation, the
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation has certified that the worker has cooperated
and cannot be rehabilitated. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-67 (1943), as amended by
Utah Laws 1959, c. 58.
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juries or losses are those whose incapacitating character need
not be established by proof. They thus constitute a unique class
from which no meaningful analogy can be drawn. It follows,
then, that in this group of states the courts are left with free
hands to define total disability as they choose.
Only a small group of four statutes afford even the barest
indication of any legislative effort to afford a definition of total
disability. Under these statutes total disability is described as
a condition that incapacitates the workman from performing
"any work at any gainful occupation. '4 3 Yet, despite the implicit
suggestion here that the worker must be virtually bedridden in
order to qualify as a totally disabled person, some of the most
liberal pronouncements by courts on total disability that the
writer has discovered emanate from these jurisdictions. 44 Cer-
tainly there is no evidence in the decisions that the statutory lan-
guage has induced the courts in these states to adopt a more
conservative attitude toward total disability than prevails else-
where.
THE JUDICIAL DEFINITION OF TOTAL DISABILITY
It would seem to follow, then, that however total disability
is to be defined, the definition must come from the judiciary in
each of the several states. The prevailing attitude of the courts,
as pointed out earlier, is that a worker is not totally disabled so
long as he can perform work that is reasonably suitable to his
capacity, even though it is different in character from what he
was doing at the time of the accident. But we cannot appraise
the significance of this point of difference between the judicial
approach adopted generally and the one that prevails in Louisi-
ana without a consideration of several factors that have an im-
portant bearing upon the comparison.
First, it should be noted that the controlling presence of the
statutory overall limitation on weekly payments found in vir-
tually all the acts4 5 may serve to attenuate any distinction be-
43. ALA. CODE 26:279(E) (1940) ; TENN. CODE ANN. 50:1007(e) (1955);
WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7679(b) (Remington 1931) ; WYO. STAT. 27:85 (1957).
To this list must be added, of course, the definition of total disability in Lou-
isiana- "disability to do work of any reasonable character." LA. R.S. 23:1221(2)
(1950).
44. See, e.g., Plumlee v. Maryland Cas. Co., 184 Tenn. 497, 201 S.W.2d 664
(1947) ; Kuhnle v. Department of Labor and Industries, 12 Wash.2d 191, 120 P.2d
1003 (1942) ; Big Horn County v. Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826 (1941).
45. The overall maximum limitations on weekly payments for permanent total
disability vary, with a few exceptions, from thirty dollars to a little over fifty
1960]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tween total and partial disability whenever the wage earned prior
to accident is substantial and the percentage of partial disability
is relatively high. One illustration will suffice: Assume that an
injury takes place in a state whose compensation statute awards
sixty-five percent of weekly wages for total disability and im-
poses a thirty-five dollar maximum upon all weekly compensation
payments. If a worker who was earning $100 per week were
totally disabled, he would be entitled to $65.00 weekly except
that the maximum overall limitation would cut down his en-
titlement arbitrarily to $35.00 per week. In view of this, how
should a court compute the weekly compensation for a worker
who was earning the same amount at time of accident but who
suffered a disability that is fixed at only sixty percent of total?
Should he be allowed sixty percent of $65.00 (subject, ultimately,
of course, to the overall limitation of $35.00 per week), or should
he have only sixty percent of $35.00 (the total amount that a
wholly disabled worker could receive) ? If the former approach
is used, the partially disabled worker will get $39.00, which must
be reduced to $35.00 in order to comply with the overall limita-
tion. In short, under this approach he would receive the same
amount as a totally disabled worker. If, however, the overall
limitation of $35.00 is accepted as the basis upon which the sixty
percent disability is to be computed, the same worker would re-
ceive only $21.00 - $14.00 less than would be his entitlement
under the first computation suggested above.
It might appear at first impression that this latter approach
is to be preferred in order to avoid a discrimination against the
totally disabled worker in favor of one who is only partially dis-
abled. However, upon further reflection it is apparent that no
real discrimination is involved unless the result is either that
funds otherwise available for payment to the totally disabled
employee's claim are used to pay the claim of the partially dis-
abled worker, or that the totally disabled worker is subject to
some arbitrary limitation not imposed upon the one who is only
partially disabled. Neither of these two aspects of discrimination
would be encountered as a result of computing the partially dis-
abled worker's percentage entitlement upon the basis of sixty-
five percent of his earnings prior to accident. Both the totally
disabled worker and the one who is only partially disabled are
subject to the same ultimate limitation of $35.00 weekly. This
limitation applies to both indiscriminately. Furthermore, the
situation of the totally disabled worker would not be bettered in
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any way by reason of the use of one method rather than another
in computing the percentage award to the partially disabled em-
ployee. The overall limitation is imposed by the statute for the
benefit solely of the employer, who is guaranteed that in no event
will he be called upon to pay more than $35.00 weekly for any
single employee injury. This protection will continue to be af-
forded him so long as neither the totally disabled claimant nor
the partially disabled claimant can secure more than that amount
weekly. The $35.00 maximum is a limitation on the final weekly
compensation, and is not a basis or formula for computing com-
pensation. This interpretation prevails in several jurisdictions, 4
including Louisiana. 47
TOTAL DISABILITY AND JUDICIAL SPECULATION
A second consideration must be borne in mind in attempting
to appraise any difference between the Louisiana version of total
disability and the version in other jurisdictions. We have already
observed that any determination by court or commission as to
the extent of a disability can be no more than a mere conjecture
as to a future state of affairs.48 The trier is obliged to make an
advance estimate of the earning capacity of an injured human
being for a period of time that extends into the future. Consider
the number of imponderables that cannot be resolved because
the trier cannot know what is going to take place after he has
handed down his judgment. Even the data relative to the in-
jured worker's physical condition rests largely on conjecture:
Consider the medical estimates as to the seriousness of the injury,
the tenuous evaluations of the effect of the physical loss upon
the performance of the mechanical operations required in a given
job, the uncertainty of the medical prognosis concerning pros-
pective improvement or deterioration of the worker's condition.
Often the best intentioned expert can only hazard a guess on any
or all of these matters.
dollars. Thirty-five dollars appears to be about average. See UNITED STATES
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 16 (1958).
46. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Holmes, 145 Tex. 158, 196 S.W.2d 390
(1946) (interesting discussion). Note, 25 TEX. L. REv. 183 (1946).
47. Hall v. Pipeline Service Corp., 233 La. 821, 98 So.2d 202 (1957) (partial
loss of use of foot set at 17.5% of $35.00 maximum) ; Evans v. Louisiana State
Board of Education, 85 So.2d 669 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956) (scheduled loss, based
upon 32 1/2% of 65% of wages, rather than upon 32 1/2% of $30.00 maximum)
Bean v. Higgins, Inc., 78 So.2d 245 (La. App. Orl. 1955) (partial disability)
MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 287 (Supp.
1960).
48. See page 489 supra.
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Even more problematical are the human and economic fac-
tors involved in a determination as to the extent of the disability.
The term "disability" is not merely a description of the physical
condition of the injured worker except in a very few jurisdic-
tions. It is true, of course, that resort to the table of specific
listed injuries results in a purely mechanical decision as to the
compensation to be awarded. But we have seen that courts seek
earnestly to circumvent the list wherever possible.49 The reason
for this is fairly obvious. The scheduled award is arbitrary and
fails to take into serious account the real purpose of compensation
- the repairing of the victim's loss of ability to earn a living in
an industrial world which is governed largely by the laws of eco-
nomics and which is influenced by chance and by the peculiari-
ties of human behavior. The potential operation of these human
and economic factors is almost impossible to predict with any
assurance, yet they cannot be ignored without serious distortion
of the entire compensation scheme. Only a few of the impon-
derables of this kind need be suggested here.
First is the instability of the industrial economy. The handi-
capped worker may encounter no difficulty in securing employ-
ment so long as times are good and the number of jobs equals or
exceeds the available number of workers. But during a period
of slack employment the one-armed worker or the employee who
complains of a stiff back will probably be among the first to be
laid off. Exposure to the uncertainties of the climate of the
economy presents an even greater hazard where the injured em-
ployee has been obliged to change the nature of his work. By
entering a strange field of endeavor he may be forced to com-
pete under the additional handicap of inexperience. Perhaps at
one time labor was a fairly adjustable force. But in this modern
day of specialized skills and crafts and of seniority privileges
conferred by organized labor the inexperienced newcomer is at
a severe disadvantage both in gaining employment and in retain-
ing it. The worker who has always labored with his hands may,
after sustaining injury, experience for a time little trouble in
selling insurance or even in operating a small restaurant or sim-
ilar enterprise of his own. The initial sympathy of fellow work-
ers and acquaintances added to a favorable but possibly tem-
porary prosperity may bring success for a while. But can one
predict with any assurance that this will continue? A sympa-
thetic employer may maintain a faithful shop man in some make-
49. See page 494 supra.
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shift job as watchman or janitor for a while, but should a hu-
mane judge or commissioner seize upon this undependable mani-
festation of human compassion as a reason for denying full com-
pensation? Again, the adaptability and fortitude of the worker
may indicate a promise that he can by sheer grit secure a job in
some new field. But should a court or commission confer upon
the employer a vested interest in the prospect that such heroism
will continue indefinitely to produce a livelihood? Discourage-
ment and human instability play a role here that cannot be
ignored.
FOR WHOSE ADVANTAGE SHOULD THE COURT SPECULATE?
It is obvious that the employer as well as the employee has
a stake in the incertitude that attends the making of an advance
estimate on the extent of disability. But an overly optimistic
speculation by the trier that the worker retains a substantial
earning power, which later turns out to be mistaken, will likely
result in a personal tragedy for the victim and will afford dra-
matic evidence of a failure to attain the beneficent purposes of
compensation. The consequences of an error resulting from an
opposite attitude, unduly favorable toward the employee, on the
other hand, are not so obvious. For the cost of a mistake in this
direction will be spread in dilution through insurance throughout
the entire society of consumers and patrons. Courts are not un-
affected by the prevailing sentiment that compensation benefits
at best are hardly adequate. For this reason the resulting hard-
ship on employers and insurers is at least less visible.
Furthermore, the form of the compensation judgment affords
a safeguard that is more readily available to the employer and
his insurer than to the employee. Compensation is generally
awarded only for the duration of disability. In theory, at least,
then, there is a later opportunity to make an adjustment and
rectify mistakes in any initial estimate that unduly favors the
employee. On the other hand the employee, in Louisiana at
least, is denied access to any mechanism for the correction of an
original erroneous estimate as to the extent of his disability. The
judgment can be modified only if there is a later change in the
physical condition of the worker. When, therefore, a court is
called upon to fix the extent of disability it does so realizing that
any error in the estimate that would operate to the prospective
disadvantage of the employee is a mistake that is virtually ir-
reparable.
1960]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
THE "ODD LOTS" DOCTRINE
It is to be expected, therefore, that courts and commissions
everywhere will approach the task of evaluating a worker's dis-
ability with an appreciation of the uncertainties involved and
that they will be inclined to so shape their definition of disability
as to lessen somewhat the chance that the worker will suffer
thereafter because of the uncertainty of medical estimates or
from any unpredictable changes in the economy or from the
caprices of human nature. This is best demonstrated in jurisdic-
tions outside Louisiana by the emergence of what has come to
be known as the "Odd Lots" doctrine. This idea, which has been
sanctioned in one way or another under virtually all the statutes,
was first stated in the much-quoted opinion of Judge Moulton in
Cardiff Corporation v. Hall.
Judge Moulton observed:
"[T]here are cases in which the onus of shewing that
suitable work can in fact be obtained does fall upon the em-
ployer who claims that the incapacity of the workman is only
partial. If the accident has left the workman so injured that
he is incapable of becoming an ordinary workman of average
capacity in any well known branch of the labour market - if
in other words the capacities for work left to him fit him only
for special uses and do not, so to speak, make his powers of
labour a merchantable article in some of the well known lines
of the labour market, I think it is incumbent upon the em-
ployer to show that such special employment can in fact be
obtained by him. If I might be allowed to use such an undig-
nified phrase, I should say that if the accident leaves the
workman's labour in the position of an 'odd lot' in the labour
market, the employer must shew that a customer can be found
who will take it. ..
This same "Odd Lots" doctrine was restated by Judge Cardozo in
his usual pungent language:
"He [plaintiff] was an unskilled or common laborer. He
coupled his request for employment with notice that the
labor must be light. The applicant imposing such conditions
is quickly put aside for more versatile competitors. Business
has little patience with the suitor for ease and favor. He is
the 'odd lot' man, the 'nondescript in the labor market.' Work,
50. Cardiff Corp. v. Hall, [1911] 1 K.B. 1009, 1020, 1021.
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if he gets it, is likely to be casual and intermittent .... Re-
buff, if suffered, might reasonably be ascribed to the narrow
opportunities that await the sick and halt. '5 1
It is apparent from what has been said above that the work-
er's claim to total disability compensation will not be denied in
other jurisdictions merely because it appears plausible that he
may be able on occasions to secure employment in work of some
kind, although different from that which he did before the acci-
dent. Some assurance must be forthcoming that he can secure
and retain fairly regular employment in such a job in competi-
tion with able bodied workers, without reference to sympathy or
the fortuity of a lush market for labor.52 Even a showing that
after the accident the worker was in fact employed in another
capacity (and even that he was so engaged at the time of trial)
does not establish per se that his disability is not total. Post-
injury earnings, even though equal to or greater than those re-
ceived before the accident, may be due to an inordinately high
demand for labor, longer working hours, or other evidence of
greater exertion, sympathy, or even pure chance. 53 Conversely,
it is true that the fact that an employee has failed to secure work
since his accident does not conclusively establish that he cannot
earn a livelihood in work of a reasonable character.
When the general attitude toward disability is thus exam-
ined, the difference between the Louisiana position and the atti-
tude prevailing elsewhere does not appear as striking as it did
upon first examination. It is apparent that under the "Odd Lots"
doctrine the fact that the employee must seek employment of a
kind different from that in which he was previously engaged will
have an important bearing on the question of the likelihood that
he will be able to retain his new job in the face of vigorous com-
petition with able-bodied workers without allowance for sym-
pathy or favorable employment conditions. The chief distinction
for the Louisiana position lies in the effect to be given to the
foreign character of the new employment which is claimed to be
available to the injured worker. The fact that the new work is
"substantially" different from the old job is conclusive in favor
of a finding of total disability in this state. In other jurisdic-
tions the fact that the worker must adjust to a different job is
51. Jordan v. Decorative Co., 230 N.Y. 522, 525, 130 N.E. 634, 635 (1921).
52. The cases are collected and discussed in 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION §§ 57.31, .32, .33, .34, .35 (1952).
53. Ibid.
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likewise a matter of substantive importance. Its effect, however,
is only relative, rather than conclusive. Even this distinction is
attenuated in Louisiana in the case of the common laborer, who
may be regarded as only partially disabled so long as he can com-
pete on substantially equal terms with other suitors for employ-
ment in the broad and diversified market for common labor.54
This type of worker receives about the same treatment in Lou-
isiana that would be accorded him elsewhere.
DEFICIENCIES OF THE KNISPEL FORMULA
However, even though the contrast between the Louisiana
approach to total disability and the general approach is prob-
ably not as sharp as may appear on first impression, yet the dis-
tinction is a very real one, and our local rule exerts a marked
effect upon the results of compensation litigation in this state.
From the standpoint of a sound and fair administration, the
Louisiana definition is subject to severe criticism. Because of its
controlling presence the judge is denied much of the power he
otherwise would possess to individualize each controversy and to
determine whether under the particular facts involved the work-
er still shows substantial promise of having the capacity to pro-
vide a dependable livelihood for himself and his family in a call-
ing which, although different from his old job, is nevertheless
fairly suitable to his abilities. The fact that the benefit of the
Knispel rule is available only to the skilled or semi-skilled worker
heightens an impression, already implicit in the rule itself, that
human dignity is offended when a skilled employee is obliged to
undertake work that is less elevated than that which he has been
accustomed to perform. It is doubtful that considerations of this
kind should play a role of any importance in the administration
of social legislation. There is probably a sound basis for the com-
mon complaint of employers that the application of the Knispel
rule encourages indolence and hampers the rehabilitation of the
handicapped labor force in this state. Certainly there can be lit-
tle doubt that the prevalence of the disability rule of Louisiana
exerts a marked effect upon our insurance premium rate. If it
can be assumed that the overall amount now available for the
payment of compensation claims is adequate and proper, this
fund would be better distributed if benefits were increased by
54. Brannon v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Assurance Co., 224 La.
161, 69 So.2d 1 (1953) ; Morgan v. American Bitumuls Co., 217 La. 968, 47 So.2d
739 (1950) ; MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 275 (Supp. 1960).
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lengthening the period of payment beyond the present four hun-
dred weeks for those who cannot secure employment in any work
whatsoever of a reasonable character. It can be plausibly argued
that the arbitrary character of the Knispel rule encourages a
large number of nuisance claims which are settled by compromise
and thus has the effect of frittering away the pool of funds that
should be available for the beneficent purposes envisaged by the
statute.
THE KNISPEL FORMULA - SYMPTOM OF A DEEPER MALADY
A review of these obvious infirmities of the Knispel rule may
appear to suggest that the Louisiana courts would be well advised
to adopt the general position that the worker should not be re-
garded arbitrarily as totally disabled merely because he has lost
the ability to do the same work he performed prior to the acci-
dent, and that the ends of justice in this state would be better
served by adopting the more flexible "Odd Lots" doctrine that
prevails in other jurisdictions. We cannot accept this conclusion,
however, without adverting again to the compelling reasons of
administration that prompted the adoption both of the Knispel
rule in this state and of the "Odd Lots" doctrine in other juris-
dictions.
These two devices emerged alike because of an aversion of the
judge or commissioner to make a present speculation at the pos-
sible expense of the worker concerning his future ability to earn
a livelihood. Both approaches encourage a resolution of doubt in
his favor, and neither of them would be necessary if it were not
for the fact that a judgment operating entirely in prospect must
be pronounced. If it were possible to administer workmen's com-
pensation through a series of independent weekly determinations
on disability (somewhat similar to the procedures employed for
the payment of unemployment benefits), equitable results could
be achieved with fairly definite rules that would afford complete
protection for the interests of the employer as well as those of
the employee. Since the compensation judgment must be formu-
lated in advance, it is not difficult to appreciate that the extent
of the latitude that will be demanded by the trier for the protec-
tion of the worker will be greatly influenced by the extent to
which the initial judgment he is required to pronounce must be
regarded by him as final and impervious to any later correction.
A judge, for example, would probably not hesitate to classify as
only partially disabled an injured worker who has since shown
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promise of learning a livelihood by operating a small restaurant
or other enterprise if the same judge could feel fairly assured
that in the event that, contrary to his expectation, the enterprise
should later fail he could re-examine his initial finding and make
a new evaluation that would accommodate such subsequent dis-
closures. If, on the other hand, the judge were faced with the
awareness that his estimate of partial disability was conclusive
and that no later adjustment would be possible, he would in all
probability retreat from the prospect of exposing the worker to
a risk of impoverishment because of a mistaken guess. This habit
of reluctance to speculate will eventually find expression as a
formalized test of disability that would favor greatly the prospect
of the worker.
The foregoing suggests, to this writer at least, that the appro-
priateness of any formula for disability must be determined in
light of the flexibility, or lack of flexibility, of the administra-
tive machinery for the handling of compensation controversies.
A disability formula strongly favoring the prospect of the worker
is to be expected in a state whose compensation statute fails to
envisage any opportunity for a correction of the results of a mis-
taken estimate as to the seriousness of the disability, while a
formula that invites a personalized judgment with greater lee-
way for the protection of the employer and insurer will likely
be forthcoming under a statute that contemplates a continuous
supervision by the court and provides adequate machinery for
this purpose.
When the matter is so viewed, we may justifiably entertain
the suspicion that our Knispel formula is merely symptomatic of
a more basic shortcoming in our Louisiana compensation statute,
and that the formula itself is the result of a well-considered de-
termination on the part of our court to evolve an approach to
disability that will serve somewhat as a counterfoil to the rigidity
of the administrative machinery established by our antiquated
compensation statute. We may therefore profitably compare in
outline the Louisiana administration with the procedures avail-
able elsewhere for supervising the compensation award and ad-
justing it to possible changing conditions in the situation of the
worker that may occur thereafter.
An adequate supervision of the compensation judgment en-
visages, first, a continuing award, payable on a weekly or other
periodic basis. The prevalence of a practice of commuting the
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judgment to a lump sum payment or of encouraging unlimited
compromise serves to deprive the court of its supervisory power.
Second, a supervision of the judgment requires adequate ma-
chinery for the reopening of the award whenever it can be dem-
onstrated that some basic estimate upon which the judgment was
predicated has since proved itself to be shortsighted in the light
of later developments.
The rigid inflexible character of the Louisiana practice in
both the above respects is apparent. Although the statute ex-
pressly contemplates weekly payments during the period of dis-
ability, yet every experienced compensation attorney in this state
knows that in virtually every instance the compensation obliga-
tion is discharged in one way or another by a single lump sum
payment. Such a final discharge can be achieved either by com-
mutation of the judgment or as the result of a compromise agree-
ment approved by the court, as authorized by R.S. 23:1273. Al-
though the practice of commuting the compensation judgment to
a lump sum under R.S. 23:1274 is disfavored in practice (be-
cause of the penalty for excessive discount),55 yet it is note-
worthy that if the parties are both willing to take and receive
a lump sum under this provision and if they comply with the
formal requirements of the statute, the court is without power
to insist that payments be made on a continuous weekly basis.5 6
This absence of judicial power to exercise control over the mak-
ing of lump sum payments in Louisiana marks a substantial de-
viation from the situation that prevails in most of the states.
Although the practice varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, yet
nearly everywhere the court or commission is vested with discre-
tion to refuse any request for commutation whenever it feels
that periodic payments would serve the best interests of the
worker. Some statutes expressly admonish the trier to refuse
commutation except under very special circumstances. The New
55. LA. R.S. 23:1274 (1950). The second paragraph is as follows: "If the
lump sum settlement is made without the approval of the court, or at a discount
greater than eight per centum per annum, even if approved by the court, the em-
ployer shall be liable for compensation at one and one-half times the rate fixed by
this Chapter, and the claimant shall, at all times within two years after date of
the payment of the lump sum settlement and notwithstanding any other provisions
of this Chapter, be entitled to demand and receive in a lump sum from the employer
such additional payment as together with the amount already paid will aggregate
one and one-half times the compensation which would have been due but for such
lump sum settlement .... " See Fluitt v. New Orleans T. & M. Ry., 187 La. 87,
174 So. 163 (1937); Reid v. J. P. Florio & Co., 172 So. 572 (La. App. Orl.
1937).
56. Agreement by the parties plus approval by the court "as reasonably con-
plying with the provisions of this [act]" are the only requirements. LA. R.S.
23:1274 (1950).
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Jersey provision is typical for this group of states.57 Even where
the terms of the statute merely vest the judge or commission with
discretion to allow or refuse commutation as the best interest of
the parties may appear, the allowance of a single lump sum pay-
ment is in general disfavor with those who administer the stat-
utes.
"The fundamental purpose of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion act is to recompense, partially, the workman for his loss
of earnings or earning power by reason of the injuries suf-
fered, arising out of and in the course of his employment. In
the event that the death of the wage earner follows as a result
of the accidental injuries, the purpose of the act is to furnish
to his dependents a fund, payable in installments, similar to
and in lieu of the weekly pay check and to recompense in part
such dependents for the loss of the benefit of the earnings
of the wage earner. It is of primary importance that this
fund be safeguarded, so that the purpose of the act - name-
ly, the care and support of those dependents - may be accom-
plished. This is to the interest of the dependents as well as
the public. The public ultimately pays such benefits by rea-
son of the increased operating costs of the employer's busi-
ness imposed upon him by the statute. If the compensation,
or any part thereof, should be paid in a lump sum, neither
the Industrial Commission nor the courts could protect the
fund. It might be lost by unwise investments or be squan-
dered and thereby the dependents become objects of charity
and an additional burden upon the public. The very object of
the statute would thereby be thwarted. The allowance of a
lump sum award is the exception and not the rule .... It fol-
lows, therefore, as a matter of public policy, that the welfare
of the workman or his dependents is best served by the pay-
ment of the compensation in regular fixed installments as
wages are paid."58
57. "In determining whether commutation will be for the best interest of the
employee or the dependents of the deceased employee, or that it will avoid undue
expense or undue hardship to either party, the bureau and the County Court will
regard the intention of this chapter that compensation payments are in lieu of
wages, and are to be received by the injured employee or his dependents in the same
manner in which wages are ordinarily paid. Commutation is to be allowed only
when it clearly appears that an unusual circumstance warrants a departure from
the normal manner of payment and not to enable the injured employee or depend-
ents of a deceased employee to satisfy a debt, or to make payment to physicians,
lawyers or others." N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:15-25 (1939).
58. Illinois Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission, 355 Ill. 253, 256, 189 N.E. 310,
311 (1934). For an excellent discussion of lump sum settlements, see DODD,
ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 719 et seq. (1936). For further
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COMPROMISE
One of the most serious problems that must be faced in the
administration of compensation concerns the permissible latitude
for compromise agreements. Where a voluntary adjustment of
differences is readily tolerated or even encouraged there is no
remaining opportunity for the court to revise or correct the
award. At this point care must be taken to distinguish the com-
promise settlement and the policies that underlie it from the
court's exercise of its power to commute a compensation award
to a lump sum. In the latter instance there is no dispute concern-
ing the existence of the claim or the amount to which the worker
is entitled. The only issue that the court must face is the desira-
bility of a single lump sum payment in final discharge of the
obligation as opposed to periodic payments. With reference to
the compromise, on the other hand, serious policy questions
arise. These are public considerations favoring prompt settle-
ment and the making of funds immediately available for the
relief of the destitute worker. These would tend to commend a
liberal attitude toward the right of the parties to make an ami-
cable settlement of their dispute. But the persuasive effect of
these considerations cannot be viewed merely from an abstract
point of view. Where the established procedure for adjudication
involves the prospect of protracted litigation, the urge to accept
some voluntary settlement device that would put a prompt end
to the controversy will be more impelling than would be the case
in a jurisdiction where there prevails a requirement of prompt
notice of accident to a commission, which then assumes automatic
control of the situation, requires full details from both parties
and exacts progress reports on the payment of medical expenses
and disability allotments. Where, as in Louisiana, the compensa-
tion scheme must shift for itself and the compensation dispute
assumes every aspect of ordinary litigation, the invitation to
compromise is almost irresistible, and the urge to oppose the
hope of gain against the risk of loss has a stronger policy justi-
fication. Whenever the compensation dispute tends to be re-
garded as just another piece of litigation, we must expect the
settlement practices that are typical of personal injury claims in
general. It is not surprising, therefore, that although the prac-
tice of compromising is fairly familiar under most compensation
statutes, yet the writer has been unable to discover any other
jurisdiction where compromise is the almost universal procedure
for disposing of serious claims that it is in Louisiana.
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In addition to the strictly litigious character of the method
for obtaining an award in this state, another factor contributes
substantially to the wider use of the compromise here than else-
where. We have already observed that the statutes have general-
ly been so interpreted as to give exclusive effect to the schedule
of specific losses of members of the body. Since the majority of
claims fall within this classification they are subject to a fairly
rigid mechanical evaluation and they bear a fixed price tag
Hence there is usually little reason for bartering between the par-
ties based upon differences between them concerning the extent
and duration of disability. Most statutes, in fact, have been inter-
preted to prohibit compromise entirely where it would result in a
payment of less than the specific benefit provided by law for a
scheduled loss.59
Furthermore, even a brief survey of the prevalence of com-
promise on the national scene must take into consideration the
fact that in those states which operate under an exclusive state
fund the compromise assumes a character entirely different from
that with which we are familiar in Louisiana. Informal agree-
ments in these states take the form of a settlement between a rep-
resentative of the commission itself and the claimant or his at-
torney.6 Since the commission is vested with responsibility for
carrying out the purpose of the statute and is not motivated sole-
ly by the.object of effecting as great a saving as possible for the
fund, the usual characteristics of a haggling between adversaries
is not prominent. It is notewo rthy that in these jurisdictions,
particularly, the amicable settlement between claimant and com-
mission can be reopened upon a satisfactory showing of mistake
or .change .of, conditions.61
Finally, it should be noted that any attempt to compromise as
to the existence of compensation liability itself is frowned upon
in many jurisdictions.6 2 The reasons for this attitude are per-
suasive. Workmen's compensation payments are geared to a so-
cial philosophy of providing a minimum subsistence for the in-
jured worker and his family. Under the compensation scheme it-
self the permissible amount of the award has been scaled down so
and vigorous criticism of the lump sum practice see SOMERS & SOMERS, WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION 159 et seq. (1954).
59. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 82.31, .32 (1952).
60. See Wollett, The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals After Nine Years:
A Partial Evaluation, 33 WASH. L. REV. 80, 89-90 (1958).
61. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 81.40 (1952).
62. See, e.g., Nagy v. Ford Motor Co., 6 N.J. 341, 78 A.2d 709 (1951).
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as to meet only bare necessities. A further reduction by com-
promise could serve to thrust upon the public (which, in the final
analysis, finances the compensation scheme) the additional cost
of supporting the destitute worker through taxes or charity. In
this respect administration of compensation differs sharply from
ordinary torts litigation where the personal wishes of the parties
are paramount and the public interest in avoiding litigation is
clear.6
Although no observer would suggest that compromise practice
is peculiar to Louisiana, or that other states are free from prob-
lems that arise from the voluntary settlement, yet the important
fact remains that because of the almost universal employment of
compromise in this state the Louisiana courts; in framing adefi-
nition of disability, must act with full awareness that the law
they make will exert its greatest effect - not in the courtroom
in future litigation - but in the course of the everyday practices
of compromise. A truly practical and effective definition of dis.
ability must be one that is- serviceable at the bargaining "table,
for this is where it will be most used. The'definition of total dis-
ability must be so framed as to equalize as much as possible the
trading powers of the parties and to offset to some' extent the
natural advantage enjoyed -by the -employer or his insuker.- The
definition must be devised with conscious recognition of the pros-
pect that whatever conclusion is arrived at between the contest-
ants will be translated into a final lump sum payment and that
an award based upon such an agreement cannot thereafter be
reexamined for any cause except fraud or imposition.
The course of the decisions in Louisiana leaves.little, doubt
that the Supreme Court has manifested serious concern over the,
almost universal prevalence of compromise in this, state and over
the tendency of this practice to deprive the courts of their power
to so administer the act as to guarantee to the worker at least
the minimal benefits envisioned by the compensation scheme.
The original section of the statute authorizing compromises
failed to specify the types of controversies that could be conclu-
sively settled. Prior to 1942, however, it was generally assumed
that a dispute of any nature whatsoever could be placed at rest
by an amicable. agreement entered into by the parties and ap-
proved by the court as to its general fairness. Compromises. re-
63. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 82.41 (1952) ;SoMRS &
SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 161 :(1954).'
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lating to the extent and duration of disability had been approved
with consistency by the courts of appeal.0 4 Any expectation, how-
ever, even at that time, that the same position would be sanctioned
by the Supreme Court rested on less sure foundations. In only
two decisions had the court of last resort considered the validity
of compromise agreements. The first of these, Musick v. Central
Carbon Company, 5 decided in 1928, approved the compromise of
a dispute concerning solely the causal relation between the acci-
dent and the employee's death that followed. The amount to
which Musick's dependents would be entitled, if any, was not
questionable. The other decision, Young v. Glynn,s 6 handed down
two years later, clearly lent some support to the assumption that
all bona fide disputes whatever fall within the compromise pro-
vision. Young had sustained an injury to his leg which was ap-
parently being restored at the time of entering into a compromise
agreement, which was based upon doubts concerning the period
required for recuperation. Thus the probable duration of dis-
ability was in question. The court affirmed the finality of the
compromise. It observed that the statute "expressly authorizes
the parties to settle the matter of compensation between them-
selves, with the approval of the judge.06 7 But it is significant
that the only issue expressly raised by the claimant was that the
agreement was procured by fraud and misrepresentation of the
employer. The facts failed to support this contention. For this.
reason the Young case was distinguishable when the Supreme
Court later determined to invalidate compromises based on dis-
putes of this kind. The turning point came with the case of
Puchner v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corporation8- in 1942.
The court announced in unequivocal language that Section 17 of
the act, as it then stood, should be construed merely as an ancil-
lary to the provision for lump sum settlements, and it even made
the broad observation that no compromise whatsoever was au-
thorized under the act if it purported to discharge the employer's
obligation by the payment of a sum less than the full amount of
compensation to which the worker may ultimately be found to
be entitled when discounted at a rate of not more than eight per-
cent, as authorized by the provision relative to commutation of
64. Forrestal v. McCray Refrigerator Sales Corp., 196 So. 516 (La. App. Orl.
1940) ; Young v. A. Marx & Son, Inc., 189 So. 167 (La. App. Orl. 1939) ; Self v.
Wyatt Lbr. Co., 189 So. 327 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) ; Bradford v. New Amsterdam
4Jas. Co., 190 So. 210 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
65. 166 La. 355, 117 So. 277 (1928).
66. 171 La. 371, 131 So. 51 (1930).
67. Ibid.
68. 198 La. 921, 5 So.2d 288 (1941).
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judgments. However, the opinion also suggested that the court
would uphold a compromise based upon a dispute as to whether
the act was applicable at all to the circumstances presented. It is
clear that the court in the Puchner case was striking chiefly at
compromises based upon speculation concerning the seriousness
of the disability or its probable duration. The opinion in the
Puchner case made clear the court's conviction that compromise
practice on the duration and extent of disability is in sharp dero-
gation of the entire scheme of workmen's compensation:
"[I] n our opinion it would be in direct violation of the letter
and spirit of the act to sanction speculation with respect to
the duration of an employee's disability, for the primary ob-
ject of the act 'was to provide an employee Whose wages Were
discontinued as a result of an injury sustained while serving
his master, with funds to subsist on until he could return to
work.' ...
"To permit speculation on the duration of an employee's
disability would defeat the very purpose of the act. It is to
be borne in mind that not only the interests of the employee
and employer is involved, but also the interest and general
welfare of the public."6 9
Following the Puchtner decision, the courts of appeal began
invalidating all compromises concerning the seriousness and du-
ration of the disability.70 This was not for long, however, be-
cause in the next session of the legislature in 1942, Section 17: of
the statute [R.S. 23:1271] was amended so as to validate all
compromises as to "the existence, nature, extent or duration of
the injury or disability . . .or any other matter or thing affect-
ing the right of the employee."71
Thereafter, following this enactment the court was obliged
to bow to the legislative will, and large scale settlement of com-
pensation claims was resumed. But there is no reason to suppose
that the court's previously expressed aversion to compromise
With reference to the extent and duration of disability came to
an end merely because the legislature had given unlimited sanc-
69. Id. at 935, 945, 946, 5 So.2d at 292, 293, 296.
70. Scott v. Caddo Parish School Board, 8 So.2d 806 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942)
(Puchner case followed reluctantly) ; Stewart v. Brown Paper Mill Co., 11 So.2d
627 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) ; Langston v. Hanbury, 11 So.2d 415 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1942) ; Craig v. Compressed Industrial Cases, Inc., 7 So.2d 197 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1941) (Puchner case followed and approved).
71. La. Acts 1942, No. 96.
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tion to the practice of compromise. Although the court was now
powerless to prevent the 'settlement of compensation disputes
through a process' based upon private speculation, yet it still re-
tainedthe means of So weighting the basic disability formula as
to reduce to a minimum all chance that the injured employee
would be Victimized by the uncertainties that make compromise
possible or by any inequality of bargaining power between the
parties. This has been the effect achieved by a faithful adher-
ence to the Knispel rule by the Louisiana courts. One is tempted
to wonder whether this rule would have withstood the continu-
ous, attacks leveled at it.during the past decade if the court had
succeeded in its effort in the Puchner case to sharply limit com-
promise practice in this state and had thus been able to assure
the victim that. the extent and duration of his disability would
at least be. determined, through the impartial operation of the
judicial process rather than through the haggling and swapping
of private bargaining.
MODIFICATION OF THE COMPENSATION AWARD
There is still left for consideration the relative opportunity
available'in Louisiana as compared with other states for a correc-
tion or modification of the compensation award in the event that
it should ilater develop that some estimate upon which the judg-
ment was based has turned out to be erroneous.% Such a compari-
son is. important, for present. purposes because even though the
extent and duration of disability is determined by the judge or
commissioner, rather than by the parties, and even though the
award is .made in terms of continuous weekly payments, never-
theless if the judgment is irrevocable and there is no later oppor-
tunity to correct even judicial mis-estimates of disability, there
would still remain a need for a formula such as the Knispel rule
that could serve to minimize the chance that the claimant would
be penalized because of a bad judicial guess concerning his future
earning capacity.
The extent of the power. of Louisiana courts to modify an
award of compensation is still, perhaps, a matter for conjecture.
R.S. 23:1331 provides in substance that at any time after six
months the judgment may be reviewed "on the grounds that the
incapacity of the employee has been subsequently diminished or
increased, or that the judgment was obtained through error,
fraud, :or misrepresentation." The chief purpose for which the
remedy provided by this section has been invoked has been to
[Vol. XX
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serve the need of the employer or his insurer who later becomes
convinced that the employee's disability no longer exist: 72 It is
noteworthy that in these situations the object sought is not in
reality a modification of the judgment. The typical compensa-
tion award directs the employer to make weekly payments "dur-
ing the period of disability, not exceeding four hundred weeks.' 7 3
If thereafter the disability ends, the award ceases to compel pay-
ment by its own terms and the employer would be justified tech-
nically in discontinuing payments without further ado. How-
ever, in order to avoid the risk of penalty or an acceleration of
later installments it is much preferable from his point of view to
seek what is in effect a declaratory judgment confirming his con-
tention that the continued state of disability upon which his judg-
ment liability depended has come to an end and that the judg-
ment has ceased to be operative. The provision authorizing a
modification of judgment serves as a convenient and acceptable
vehicle for this purpose.
Instances wherein the worker in Louisiana has succeeded in
securing a modification of the award because of a change in his
physical condition since the rendition of judgment are virtually
non-existent. The reasons are obvious. Continuous adherence to
the Knispel rule has created a situation wherein awards for
only partial disability are rare indeed. Usually the judgment
is either for total permanent or for nothing. In the former in-
stance the award is-for the full maximum period of four hundred
weeks, and there is no occasion for the .worker to seek a modifica-
tion. In the case of awards for scheduled losses there is no basis
for modifying the judgment, since these awards are made only
where there is no accompanying disability.74 One exception, how-
ever, should be noted. If a non-disabling injury that results in an
award for a specific loss should later become worse so that the
worker is disabled, there is ample ground for a modification. In
fact, the only instance discovered by the writer wherein a claim-
72. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 281,
n. 63 (1951).
73. LA. R.S. 23:1221(1), (2), (3) (1950). An award for a fixed number of
weeks is also-authorized by R.S. 23:1222. This; however, is usually restricted .by
the courts to cases where it appears that:the disability will continue for a period
of less than six months.
74. Trahan Y. Louisiana State Rice Milling Co., 100 So.2d 914 (La. App. 1st'
Cir. 1958); Green v. Harper, 103 So.2d 474 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958). See dis-.
cussion in Bell v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp., 152 So. 766, 769 (La.
App. Orl. 1934).
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ant succeeded in securing a modification of an award involved
this situation.
75
Occasionally the.court, exercising a discretion vested in it by
R.S. 23:1222, may fix arbitrarily the number of weeks for pay-
ment for temporary disability, based upon the judge's estimate
as to the duration of the incapacity. 76 This type of award may
give occasion for a petition by the worker for modification. In
one instance this was sought. The claimant maintained that he
was totally and permanently disabled and the judgment award-
ing him compensation was framed on that basis. However, for
reasons not clear in the opinion, he was adjudged entitled to com-
pensation for only three hundred weeks. Toward the close of this
period he sought an additional one hundred weeks - the maxi-
mum allowable for total permanent disability. This was denied
by the Supreme Court. The opinion emphasized that there could
be no greater disability than total permanent (upon which the
initial award was based) .7 The suit for modification was based,
therefore, merely upon an error by the trial judge, and this could
be corrected only by an appeal from the original judgment filed
within the time required by law.
Recently, in Lacy v. Employers Mutual Insurance Company of
Wisconsin7 the Supreme Court has established an additional im-
pediment to any effort to modify a disability award made for a
specific number of weeks. Awards of this kind are seldom made
except in situations where it appears that the disability will end
within six months from the date of judgment. It should also be
noted that no modification of any kind is authorized until after
the expiration of a six months period. By this time, of course,
the judgment will have been fully discharged. Thus there arises
the question as to whether modification is available for a judg-
ment that has already been fully satisfied. The court answered
this question in the negative in the Lacy case, thus closing the
75. Harris v. Southern Carbon Co., 182 So. 370 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938),
applying instructions given in 189 La. 992, 181 So. 469 (1938).
76. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 280,
n. 47 (1951).
77. Brown v. Leard, 131 So. 311 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1930) (with dissenting
opinion).
78. 233 La. 712, 98 So.2d 162 (1957). The writer questioned the soundness of
this decision in 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 341, 345 (1959). The same problem
has received varied treatment under other statutes. Compare CONN. REV. STAT.
5 7434 (1949) (limiting the duration of the reopening period to the duration of
the original award) and OHIO CODE § 1456-86 (1948) (allowing a designated
period after the last payment of compensation). See generally 2 LARSON, WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 81.20 (1952).
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door to a modification in virtually the only situation where that
type of relief would be sought by the worker. One gains the gen-
eral impression both here and in other Louisiana decisions 9 that
finality of judgment is of more importance than a continuous
supervision over the welfare of the worker. It seems fair to con-
clude that the prevailing attitude in this state is that the initial
determination as to disability should be made in such a way as to
reduce to a minimum the chance of any mis-estimate of the work-
er's incapacity that could later operate to his disadvantage, and,
that thereafter the case should be regarded as closed.
The power of courts and commissions elsewhere to modify
awards varies considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The
statutes are generally similar, however, in two important re-
spects that serve to distinguish them from the situation in Lou-
isiana. First, modification of an award is generally allowable for
a change in employment conditions resulting in claimant's inabil-
ity to get a job.80 Any prediction that this would be true in Lou-
isiana would be most incautious. Every instance of modification
in the reported cases has been based upon a change in the work-
er's physical condition. Returning to the modification picture in
other states, we find that several of the statutes reserve to the
commission a broad continuing jurisdiction over the award.8 ' In
this respect we can note a sharp difference in attitude in those
states whose statutes are administered by commissions as com-
pared with the jurisdictions that adhere to court administration.
In the latter group there is a marked tendency to regard the com-
pensation award in the same light as a judgment on any other
matter. This attitude, of course, leaves completely out of account
the fact that compensation is basically a paternalistic and pro-
tective scheme designed to insure to the worker and the public
alike that the injured victim will receive a minimum subsistence
79. Faircloth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 147 So. 368 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933) ;
Brown v. Leard, 131 So. 311 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1930) ; Sweeney v. Black River
Lbr. Co., 4 La. App. 244 (1926).
80. E.g., Ray v. Frenchmen's Bay Packing Co., 122 Me. 108, 119 Atl. 191
(1922) ; 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 81.31 (1952).
81. The most serious problem relative to an unlimited power to reopen a com-
pensation award relates to problems of proof and the necessity of preserving records
of controversies that were disposed of many years previously. Also insurers justi-
fiably complain of the virtual impossibility of computing reserves to meet con-
tingencies of this kind. New York has met this problem through its Fund for
Reopened Cases, supported by an assessment on all carriers. SOMERS & SOMERS,
WORMEN'S COMPENSATION 163 (1954). Nevertheless, nine states (Delaware,
Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, North Dakota
and Utah) permit reopening at any time. Other states impose a time limitation of
some kind. See the interesting study in DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION 206-07 (1936).
19601
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
and will not become a public charge. Continued interest in the
case by the tribunal, be it court orcommission, is essential to the
attainment of this objective.. The compensation scheme should
not be left to shift for itself once the controversy has been adju-
dicated.-
A second difference between the approach to modification of
an award as it exists in Louisiana as compared with other states
relates to the power of the tribunal to modify a judgment based
upon a compromise between the parties. We have already ob-
served that freedom of the parties to compromise is more limited
in other jurisdictions than in Louisiana. Furthermore, in most
jurisdictions the power to reopen is unaffected by any distinc-
tion between awards based on agreements and awards in con-
tested cases.S2 This stands in sharp contrast with the picture in
Louisiana, where the compromise agreement, once approved by
the court, is a final and conclusive determination of the rights of
all parties except in cases of fraud or misrepresentation. 3 Here
again we find the Louisiana statute by its terms manifesting a
keener interest in inducing a final disposition of the controversy
than in insuring that the objectives of the compensation scheme
should be carried out. Again we have been influenced by the
false analogy to ordinary personal injury litigation.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the foregoing observations have suggested to the
reader that the Louisiana disability formula as set forth in Knis-
pel v. Gulf States Utilities and which has been carefully pre-
served by our Supreme Court against encroachment for thirty
years is not to be accounted for as a mere piece of judicial inad-
vertence or as an early misconception by our courts to which they
have obstinately adhered. Neither is the rule an instance of
sentimentalism inspired by an overly compassionate attitude to-
ward the injured worker. It represents, rather, a definite judi-
cial effort to evolve an effective counterfoil against the rigidity
82. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 81.40 (1952). It must be
noted, however, that this is not true where the award based upon agreement re-
sults in a lump sum settement. The proper objective here, as pointed out earlier,
is to reduce to a minimum the instances in which a lump sum settlement can be
made.
83. LA. R.S. 23:1273 (1950) ; MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW AND PRACTICE § 387, n. 52 (1952). The latest instance is Griffin v. Coal
Operator's Casualty Co., 84 So.2d 481 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955) (settlement made
upon mutual assumption that leg bones were held together by a surgical plate,
and only matter in dispute was required time for healing; in fact, pins in plate had
broken and claimant was totally disabled; settlement held conclusive).
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and inflexibility of our- scheme .for administering.compensation
controversies and' against the legislative tolerance and even en-
couragement of free compromise practices. Illogical as the Knis-
pel rule may appear when viewed in the abstract, perhaps this is
the price we must pay for the convenience- of compromise and for
the dubious benefits of avoiding a commission with more flexible
procedures and a continuing jurisdiction over the compensation
scheme.
